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COURSE OF THE CRISIS; 1840-41.
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exchange transactions to $100 millions without the employment of extraordinary means. "The currency of the country became sound, and the negotiations in the exchanges were carried on at the lowest possible rates. The circulation was increased to more than $22 millions, and the notes of the Bank were regarded as equal to specie all over the country, thus showing almost conclusively that it was the capacity to deal in exchanges, and not in local discounts, which furnished these facilities and advantages." The exchange transactions produced few losses. "Its power of local discount has, in fact, proved to be a fruitful source of favoritism and corruption, alike destructive to the public morals and to the general weal." He ends with a declaration of his unalterable opposition to any bank created by Congess with the power to establish branches in the States independently of their consent.

At the same time that he vetoed this bill, he signed the repeal of the sub-treasury. The State rights men of the strict school to which Tyler belonged laid great stress on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Bank of Augusta vs. Earle.[1] International law was applied to the relations of corporations of one State doing business in another. Formal assent was held to be necessary for a bank of one State to discount notes in another, but as to exchange, assent was assumed until formally refused.

Another bank bill was introduced into the House August 20th, and hastily passed the Congress. The capital was to be $21 millions, increasable to $35 millions. It was to have agencies only, and to deal in exchange only.

In a veto of this bill September 9, 1841, Tyler repeated more than once, and with emphasis, his objection to a national bank acting per se over the Union. "It assumes that Congress may invest a local institution with general or national powers. With the same propriety that it may do this in regard to a bank of the District of Columbia it may as to a State bank."

He asked for a postponement of the subject to a "more auspicious period for deliberation." He laid great stress on his conscientious and religious motives, his reverence for the Constitution, and his desire for harmony.

The men of 1841 reasoned that the issues of a bank of discount would depend for their value on the discount business. Hence the issues of currency should be divorced from that business; secondly, they reasoned that the government deposits, if put in a bank of discount, would be loaned and could not be recalled when wanted without creating a panic. Hence they were trying to create an institution to issue currency, hold the government deposit, and equalize the exchanges without any real banking function. Nearly all the whigs except Webster treated with scorn and derision Tyler's notion of a national bank. He and his adherents were struggling with the notion of an Issue Department connected with the Treasury. It is not at all impossible that, if the plan could have been set on foot, it might have developed into a good solution of the currency problem.

  1. 13 Peters, 519.