which they could lay their hands on. My field officers, except those of Breckenridge's command, were on foot, as their horses could not be transported on the trains from Charlottesvilie. I had seen our soldiers endure a great deal, but there was a limit to the endurance even of Confederate soldiers. A stern chase of infantry is a very difficult one, and Hunter's men were marching for their lives, his disabled being carried in his provision train which was now empty. My cavalry was not strong enough to accomplish anything of importance, and a further pursuit could only have resulted in disaster to my command from want of provisions and forage.
I was glad to see Hunter take the route to Lewisburg, as I knew he could not stop short of the Kanawha River, and he was, therefore, disposed of for some time. Had he moved to South-Western Virginia he would have done us incalculable mischief, as there was no troops of any consequence in that quarter, but plenty of supplies at that time. I should, therefore, have been compelled to follow him.[1]
My command had marched sixty miles, in the three days pursuit, over very rough roads, and that part of it from the Army of Northern Virginia had had no rest since leaving Gaines' Mill. I determined, therefore, to rest on the 22nd, so as to enable the waggons and artillery to get up, and prepare the men for the long march before them. Imboden had come up, following on the road through Salem after the enemy, and the cavalry was sent through Fincastle, to watch the enemy
- ↑ Grant, in his report .says: "General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place (Lynchburg). This is a little remarkable, as it appears that this expedition had been long contemplated and was one of the prominent features of the campaign of 1864. Sheridan, with his cavalry, was to have united with Hunter at Lynchburg, and the two together were to have destroyed General Lee's, communications and depots of supplies, and then have joined Grant. Can it be believed that Hunter set out on so important an expedition with an insufficient supply of ammunition? He had fought only the battle of Piedmont, with a part of his force, and it was not a very severe one, as Jones' force was a small one and composed mostly of cavalry. Crook's column not being there was not engaged. Had Sheridan defeated Hampton at Trevillian's. he would have reached Lynchburg after destroying the railroad on the way, and 1 could not have reached there in time to do any good. But Hampton defeated Sheridan, and the latter saw "infantry"' "too strong to successfully assault." Had Hunter moved on Lynchburg, with energy, that place would have fallen before it was possible for me to get there. But he tarried on the way for purposes which will hereafter appear, and when he reached there, his heart failed him and he was afraid to fight an inferior force, and then there was discovered, "A want of ammunition to give battle."
