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THE CIVIL WAR OF 1891 343 arms, as well as those from the surrounding nitrate works, were brought into the service. And from the coast towns the congressional fleet brought in as many recruits as could be obtained. In this way an army of about three thousand men was raised. The revolutionists doubtless expected that the gov- ernment detachments, commanded at different points by Robles, Gana, Arrate and Camus, would unite and fall upon Iquique. This, however, was not done. There was bad management. Colonel Robles was brave enough, and commanded in chief, but he was seventy years old and a poor strategist. He halted at Sebas- topol, about twenty-five miles southeast of Iquique, and from there sent word to the junior officers to rejoin him. But the Atacama desert, which for so many cen- turies destro3'ed the Inca armies and many times turned back invaders, could not well be traversed by the other detachments, without water. Besides, Colo- nels Gana, Arrate and Camus, acting each upon his own judgment, had sent off portions of their troops to protect coast towns. Colonel Robles moved forward to Pozo al Monte. Here he received reinforcements from Colonel Arrate's detachment, and without waiting for the other detach- ments to send what men they could, rashly determined to move forward and attack the enemy, who was now advancing. Robles underrated both the valor and the strength of the enemy, who numbered 2,600 men, with some cavalry, three field-batteries, and several gatling guns. The government troops for a time seemed likel)' to prevail. Robles, though wounded himself, ordered a general advance. But a flank movement, performed b}' a body of cavalry accompanied by some infantry, was ordered by Colonel Canto, who commanded the congressional troops, probably in anticipation of the