that China and Japan shall speedily agree upon terms of peace alike honorable to both, and not humiliating to Korea," he could not join the powers in an intervention.
President Cleveland felt, however, that the United States should exert its influence for peace, and he decided to make an independent effort in that direction. On November 6 the Secretary of State instructed the American minister in Tokio to represent to the Japanese government that while the deplorable war endangered no policy of the United States, whose attitude towards the belligerents was that of an impartial and friendly neutral, desiring the welfare of both, and cherishing the most friendly sentiments towards Japan, the President directed him to ascertain whether a tender of his good offices in the interest of peace would be acceptable to that government. He was also instructed to convey the caution, which soon after became a humiliating reality, that "if the struggle continues without check to Japan's military operations, it is not improbable that other powers having interests in that quarter may demand a settlement not favorable to Japan's future security and well-being." The reply of Japan to this overture was that it appreciated the amicable sentiments which prompted the United States, but that the universal success of the arms of Japan seemed to relieve its government of the necessity of resorting to the cooperation of friendly powers for a cessation of hostilities; that it would not press its victories beyond the limits which would guarantee to it the just and reasonable fruits of the war; but that
