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468 /. F. Rhodes Considering everything that could have been known between No- vember I and 1 2 it seems clear beyond dispute that he made a fair division of his army between himself and Thomas. Deliberation, care and foresight marked the thoughts of Sher- man as he reviewed his decision ; up to within six days of his start southward he held himself ready in a certain contingency to co- operate with Thomas in the pursuit of Hood, the one moving directly against the Confederates and the other endeavoring to cut off their retreat, for it was ever clear to his mind that " the first object should be the destruction of that army," but as the days wore on the advantages of the march to the sea outweighed those of any other plan and the irrevocable step was taken. Stopping at Cartersville, November 12, on his progress southward he received Thomas's last despatch, acknowledged it and replied "all right ; " a bridge was burned severing the telegraph wire and all communi- cation with Thomas and his government. Like Julian who "plunged into the recesses of the Marcian or Black forest," the fate of Sherman was for many days " unknown to the world." No direct intelligence from him reached the North from November 12 to December 14. " I will not attempt to send couriers back," he had written to Grant, "but trust to the Richmond papers to keep you well advised." Yox these thirty-two days Lincoln and Grant had no other information of this important movement than what they gleaned from the Southern journals. Sherman's imagination was impressed vividly with the strange- ness of the situation: "two hostile armies were marching in oppo- site directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive result in a great war." It would be impossible to show an entire consistency in the utterances of this great general ; at times one aspect of the campaign appeared to him to the exclusion of another, and as he was given to fertile thought and fluent expression the idea uppermost in his mind was apt to come out. As with al- most all men of action, the speculation of to-day might differ from that of yesterday and vary again to-morrow, yet this did not impair a capacity to make a correct decision nor steadfastness in the execution of a plan. Grant, more reticent and not ex- pansive, is not chargeable in the same degree with inconsistency in his written words. He lacked imagination and was not given to worry. When any comparison is made between the two, the re- mark attributed to Sherman is pat as indicating the different man- ner in which they seem to look a situation in the face. " Grant does not care for what he cannot see the enemy doing and it scares me."