as we might wish. The definition of delusiveness and non-delusiveness is sufficiently obvious, namely, a perceptual object is non-delusive when it is the apparent character of an event which is itself an active condition for the appearance of that character as perceptible from all percipient events. In the nomenclature of Chapter VII of Part II the situation of a physical object is its ‘generating event.’
Now if this definition is to be taken to the foot of the letter, all perceptual objects are delusive; for all perception is belated. The sun which we see is the apparent character of an event simultaneous with our percipient event, and this event is about eight seconds subsequent to the generating event corresponding to that appearance of the sun. In the case of other astronomical phenomena the discrepancy is more glaring. In the case of terrestrial perceptual objects the discrepancy is less glaring in many cases, though for sounds it is very insistent and is the reason of their very indeterminate situations. But, speaking generally and admitting exceptions, for the greater part of ordinary domestic perceptions the belatedness of the apparently characterised event behind the causally characterised event is a small fraction of the percipient’s specious present.
Accordingly our knowledge of causal characters is a theory built up by ignoring this element of delusiveness in all perceptual objects, and then by introducing it as an additional correction in the exceptional cases.
61. Transition from Appearance to Cause. 61.1 But how can we pass from appearance to cause, seeing that our knowledge of nature is confined to awareness of appearance? For example, all measurement is a measurement of appearance.
