of the mind, and thus the conception of universal nature can have no relevance to our perceptual life. This is not how Berkeley stated his criticism of materialism; he was thinking of substance and matter. But this variation is a detail and his criticism is fatal to any of the traditional types of ‘mind-watching-things’ philosophy, even if those things be events and not substance or material. His criticisms range through every type of sense-perception, though in particular he concentrates on Vision.
3.2 “Euphranor.[1] Tell me, Alciphron, can you discern the doors, windows, and battlements of that same castle?
Alciphron. I cannot. At this distance it seems only a small round tower.
Euph. But I, who have been at it, know that it is no small round tower, but a large square building with battlements and turrets, which it seems you do not see.
Alc. What will you infer from thence?
Euph. I would infer that the very object which you strictly and properly perceive by sight is not that thing which is several miles distant.
Alc. Why so?
Euph. Because a little round object is one thing, and a great square object is another. Is it not so?
Alc. I cannot deny it.
Euph. Tell me, is not the visible appearance alone the proper object of sight?
Alc. It is.
What think you now (said Euphranor, pointing towards the heavens) of the visible appearance of yonder planet? Is it not a round luminous flat, no bigger than a six-pence?
Alc. What then?
Euph. Tell me then, what you think of the planet itself? Do
- ↑ Alciphron, The Fourth Dialogue, Section 10.
