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CH. I.]
ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE.
129

sensible, and if there were any property not perceptible by us, we should perceive that another sentient organ was required; but it has not been shewn that such a want, had it not previously been satisfied, could be made sensible to us. And even for the Touch itself, were there any one property, of which we are sensible, say that of hardness, which had never been perceived, we could hardly be conscious of the want; and there may be, probably are properties in the bodies around and above us of which we are unconscious, and yet remain without the feeling of a want. Each of the senses seems to be an ultimate fact; for we are satisfied that we see by the eye and hear by the ear, and that with so little attention or will that the sentient organs perform their part almost irrespectively of the percipient. In the succeeding passages, which relate to media and the elementary constitution of the senses, there is ambiguity or confusion, occasioned by the then prevailing dogmata of elements and like by like, and perhaps, it may be added, by unacquaintance with the structure of the sentient organs.