examining any object, that we imagine to be so or so, a man for instance, but we so express ourselves rather when we do not clearly perceive what the object is, and when the perception may be true or false; when, to use a former expression, the object appears to us as landscapes do to the purblind.
Neither can imagination be regarded as one of those faculties, such as knowledge and mind, which are always true, for it admits of being false as well; and it remains for us to consider whether it is opinion, since opinion may be both true and false. But belief follows upon opinion, (as it is not admissible that an individual should not believe in that upon which he has an opinion,) and belief belongs to no irrational creature although imagination is imparted to many. Belief, besides, is an attendant upon every opinion, as persuasion is upon belief, and reason alone can persuade ; but although imagination belongs to some irrational creatures, reason has been given to none. It is manifest, then, that imagination can neither be opinion with or through sensation, nor a combination of opinion with sensation; and for the same reasons evident, that opinion is from nothing else but that from which sensation is derived. By which I mean, if imagination be the combination of an opinion of whiteness and a sensation of whiteness, and not of an opinion of goodness with a sensation of whiteness, then to imagine is to think upon what has been sensually
