the Vital Principle, being an essence, cannot be subject
to casual motion; and then it has been shewn that a
motor is not, necessarily, itself in motion. There seems,
however, to have been some difficulty in refusing all
motion to the Vital Principle, since the emotions and
passions which emanate from it seem to be motions, or
combined with motions,—as passion excites and fear de-
presses the motions of the heart, and deep thought furrows
the brow; but Aristotle, in order to reconcile these with
his own opinion, has recourse to an hypothesis which is
left for future inquiry. It is well said, however, that the
man rather than the Vital Principle is moved by passions
and emotions; and thus motion may descend from it, as
the first motor, and at rest, to the several organs, (act, that
is, upon the temperament,) or ascend to it, by perception
of the external world, for memory. Philoponus, comment-
ing upon this passage, observes, as proof that recollection
originates in the Vital Principle and thence permeates to
the body, that, "when reminded of any fearful incident
we turn pale, and when recalling a voyage we become
qualmish."
Note 3, p. 40. The mind seems to be a peculiar innate essence, &c.] Aristotle has nowhere denned this great faculty, to which he attributed so high a destiny and such lofty privileges—"intellectus nihil patitur; est atque manet;" but the opinion was not exclusively his, nor did it originate with him, for Anaxagoras[1], and before him,
- ↑ Metaphys. I. 3. 10.
