the instrument. Thus, vision is the essence of an eye, as
cutting is that of an axe, for, could the organ or instru-
ment be deprived of those faculties, they would no longer,
save in name, be eye or axe; and this holds good of the
living body, which, if deprived of its essence, its Vital
Principle that is, being no longer able to fulfil its
purposes in creation, is not to be regarded, save in name,
as an organised body.
Note 10, p 61. It is then obvious that neither Vital
Principle, &c.] There is an apparent contradiction in this
passage, owing to the want of completeness in the argu-
ment—the Vital Principle, as the essence, cannot be
distinct from the organs of the body, since they depend
upon it for their functions; but the mind, being im-
passive, (ἀπαθὴς ὁ νοῦς) and the cause of all the higher
faculties, may exist apart from all which is corporeal and
even sentient, and thus survive the body's death and
decay. Thus, Aristotle has elsewhere observed that it is
scarcely possible for anything to be of higher value or
more influential than the Vital Principle, and quite
impossible that anything should be more so than the
mind.
Note 11, p. 61. It is doubtful, however, whether, &c.] Whether, that is, the Vital Principle is separable from the body, as the mariner is from his vessel—whether, as he is not necessarily involved in its wreck, so it may survive the death of the body. But the question evidently pertains to psychology, and can scarcely be
