not constantly thinking, just as it has been asked why the sensibility, which is ever acted upon by external influences, is not constantly made percipient. The answer seems to be, that the sensibility, being in potentiality, is incapable of perception without the agency of external influences, while the mind, being immaterial, is able to judge of the relations of things, without being identified with them; and thus, that, although every object, as a subject of thought, may be said to belong to the mind, it cannot belong to any one of them. It may well, however, be said, with respect to this, among other passages of this chapter, "est enim Aristotelis, liberum cogitationis cursum sequi neque anxia perspicuitatis causa deflecti."
CHAPTER V.
Note 1, p. 156. As if it were a virtuality like light.] The original ὡς ἕξις τις is ill represented by virtuality, and yet neither habit, state, nor condition would represent the agency of the mind as a realising principle; as that
which can collect, compare, and so give reality, in generalisations, to perceptions received through the senses. "Sicut colores expectant, ut appareant, (i.e. ut colorum
vice vere fungantur) ita sensuum notitiæ et quidquid ad intellectum patientem pertinet mentem agentem requirunt,
