CHAPTER VIII.
Note 1, p. 169. But the question here must necessarily refer, &c.] This argument, while maintaining the opinion that sensibility is receptive of form without matter, is an objection to the doctrine of Empedocles and others, who, having derived the Vital Principle from material elements, made perception to be material also, in the relation of like by like. But here it is said that, as the hand is the instrument for making instruments, so the mind is the archetype of forms, and sensibility the recipient of the forms of things without their matter, perceived through the senses. Aristotle, however, does make imagery, the power that is, of recalling forms, to be essential to cogitation, and, consequently, to reflection; although doubting whether there may not be thoughts which cannot have a sentient origin.
Note 2, p. 170. Imagination, on the other hand, &c.] Imagination, or the faculty which calls up images is, necessarily, different from that which determines the truth or falsehood of any proposition, and which affirms or denies; for affirmation or negation, as the predicant of something held to be true or erroneous, is, as was said, a combination of thoughts; and thoughts, being made up
