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If I wrote this Memorandum for Russians, I should have much more to say on the Russian army and Russian policy; here I content myself with the bare statement, that the Russian defeat was not caused merely by lack of ammunition. We know now, that even the Germans, on some occasions were short of ammunition, as they are ready enough to confess to-day. The great shortcoming of the Russian army was caused by certain peculiar features of the general staff and its relation to the generalissimo; besides there were serious faults in the military administration, and Russian policy in the occupied territories was not worthy of the occasion. The disgraceful affair of Massoïedoff has already been mentioned.
I regretted from the beginning that the Russian campaign did not disclose any real political plan; the liberation of the Poles and other Slavs, the protection of Servia was proclaimed; but these great aims were not matched by deeds. Very soon it became obvious that Russia’s whole policy was dwindling to the annexation of Eastern Galicia; the Balkans, Constantinople and Asia were forgotten, the Army of the Caucasus was doomed to secondary and purely local strategy. Now we see the fruit of the Russian defeat. The Germans are not far from Constantinople, Persia is very disturbed and China may soon follow.
It was in the year 1887 that I learned from a Russian officer, during a visit in Russia, that in case of war with Germany the Germans would try to invade Petrograd, and since that time I had this possibility before my mind, and in an article written at the very beginning of the war expressed the apprehension that the Germans would aim at Petrograd. It is always dangerous to let the enemy create a precedent. Of course the Russians have the precedent of East Galicia and its benefit, but that is of a much lesser value than the German precedent.
The expulsion of the Germans from Russian Poland will be a serious task; the Germans will be very strongly entrenched; the Austrians have fortified, under German leading, all the Carpathian mountain-passes and defiles, and have prepared trenches, the destruction of which will require many batteries of heavy guns. The lessons of the retreat and of the first occupation will, I hope, prevent the reiteration of the bad mistakes made in the administration of the occupied territories, not only towards the Poles and Jews, but also towards the Ruthenes. I am sorry to be obliged to say that the Russians alienated many sympathies there; and it was only the blunders of the Austrian administration after the re-occupation that counter-balanced this loss.
18.—Lack of Co-operation and Unity among the Allies.
The Allies, then, not being military nations such as the Germans and, therefore, not being as prepared for war as these specialists in soldiering, had to learn by the war. But it is to be hoped that the time of apprenticeship has been served—though, of course, the Germans have learned as well. In any case, in all the countries of the Allies, in Britain just as in France and Russia, the Parliaments and the public expect a more prosperous campaign of their armies. To that end, criticism is becoming general and advice is being given both with regard to the Government and the armies. The changes in the various Governments show that the latter themselves acknowledge that these criticisms are not unfounded or inopportune.
The Times war correspondent (12th of November) gives the view of the Russian main headquarters to the effect, that had there been from the beginning of the war a closer co-ordination of the allied armies, we should not have had to deplore the Carpathian adventure, and the temporary eclipse of Russia’s military power. I agree with the correspondent; but all the Allies, especially the three great Powers, are equally responsible for this lack of unity. More-
