SECOND PART.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
20.—More Soldiers!
If, as I believe, my criticisms have been positive as well as negative (and there is a great difference between the two!), the answer to the question: “What is to be done?” must be—to avoid or to make good mistakes and, where necessary, to change the methods of procedure, to get the clearest possible insight into the tremendous significance of the present world struggle.
Money—money—and again money, has been described as the principal requisite of war; to-day we must alter this dictum and say: men—men—and again more men! Men, of course, means soldiers.
It is to Russia and Great Britain that we look for the augmentation of the allied armies; the Allies must have larger armies than the enemy at the front, and they must have such reserves of men trained and ready, that a surprise like that in the Balkans shall no longer be possible.
If the French army is five millions strong, Britain must raise the same number; five millions being the amount of recruits for which she would be liable as a conscript country. Russia must have at least seven millions; that is, compared with Britain and France, a low number, but I take into account the heavy losses of the original Russian army, especially the heavy losses of officers,[1] then the financial strength of the country and the productive power of its war industry.
- ↑ From a reliable Russian source I was informed that the number of German officers taken prisoners is remarkably low: among the Austrian prisoners one officer out of 60, among the German prisoners one officer out of 560 soldiers! I cannot explain how the German officers could thus escape—at any rate, the German army is adequately supplied with officers (and non-commissioned officers), whereas the Russian and British armies have not enough experienced officers. The French army has enough officers.
