Page:Brinkley - Japan - Volume 2.djvu/199

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WEAPONS AND OPERATIONS

future might produce. Something of that credit they certainly deserved, for their principles are not yet out of date: "An army undertaking an offensive campaign must be twice as numerous as the enemy. A force investing a fortress should be numerically ten times the garrison. Troops for escalade should muster five for every one of their foes. When the adversary holds high ground, turn his flank; do not deliver a frontal attack. When he has a mountain or a river behind him, cut his lines of communication. If he deliberately assumes a position from which victory is his only escape, hold him there but do not molest him. If you can surround him, leave one route open for his escape.[1] Be warned of an ambush when you see birds soaring in alarm, and if animals break cover in your direction, look out for an onset. When you have to cross a river, post your advance-guard and your rear-guard at a distance from the banks and never approach with the bulk of your troops. When the enemy has to cross a river, let him get well engaged in the operation before you strike at him. If a marsh has to be traversed, make celerity your first object. Pass no copse, enter no ravine, nor approach any thicket until your scouts have explored it fully." Such precepts are multiplied, and there is much about stratagems, deceptions, and, above all, the employment of spies. But when they discuss tactical formations, these ancient authors do not


  1. See Appendix, note 30.

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