ENLIGHTENED GOVERNMENT
raising an army, even though they had not appreciated that such a measure would ring the knell of the samurai class.
While the pain of this blow was still fresh, the question of Korea's contumacious conduct presented itself. It produced an immediate and violent disruption in the ranks of the little band of reformers. Saigo saw in a foreign war the sole remaining chance of achieving his ambition by lawful means. The Government's conscription scheme, yet in its infancy, had not produced even the skeleton of an army. If Korea had to be conquered, the samurai must be employed, and their employment would mean, if not their rehabilitation, at least their organisation into a force which, under Saigo's leadership, might dictate a new polity. Other members of the Cabinet believed that the nation would be disgraced if it tamely endured Korea's insults. Thus several influential voices swelled the clamour for war. But a peace party offered strenuous opposition. Its members perceived the collateral issues of the problem, and declared that the country must not think of taking up arms during a period of radical transition. The final discussion took place in the Emperor's presence. Probably none of those engaged in it understood the whole scope of its national significance, or perceived that they were debating, not merely whether there should be peace or war, but whether the country should halt or advance on its newly adopted
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