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southwest edge of the Joliet Airport so that the wind direction might be observed. The Captain, shortly after passing the airport boundary, made a sharp 180-degree turn from a general southeasterly heading, at an altitude of about 200 feet, in order to make a landing approach toward the northwest. During the latter part of this turn the flaps were extended and the aircraft was lined up to approach the Southeast-Northwest runway. The aircraft landed at a point about 1280 feet from the southeast end of the runway which is 2960 feet in length. The aircraft rolled and skidded on the runway which was wet and also had small patches of loose shale. Brakes were applied, locking the wheels approximately 150 feet beyond the point of landing, and thereafter were applied intermittently until the aircraft stopped. This braking action was evidenced by the tires which were severely worn in large flat spots, and also by tire slide marks on the concrete runway. The First Officer had assisted the Captain in applying the brakes.
The aircraft could not be stopped within the confines of the airport and after continuing straight ahead through the metal airport boundary fence it struck a parked automobile and an obstruction light pole, went through another fence and, about 485 feet beyond the end of the runway, came to rest after penetrating the side of a barn to a depth of eight feet. The speed of the aircraft upon leaving the end of the runway estimated as 25 m.p.h.
Subsequent investigation disclosed that the existing wind was from the northeast and that the pilot knew he was landing approximately crosswind. The runway in the direction of this wind (northeast-southwest) is slightly longer than the one which was used and is known by the personnel operating at the subject airport to afford a better braking surface in wet weather. However, the length of the southeast-northwest runway would have been ample if proper precaution and had been exercised in the approach.
At the time of the approach to the Chicago Airport, the weather there included a visibility of 1-¼ miles or more and a ceiling of 900 feet with lower broken clouds at 200 feet and light rain and light fog. The Captain subsequently stated, in connection with the approach to Chicago, that because of the fact that he had a new co-pilot (First Officer) he was obliged not only to work the approach problem but to listen to all radio contacts as well, and that this extra work contributed to his not effecting a normal landing. Other scheduled aircraft pilots experienced no unusual difficulty in landing at Chicago for appreciable periods of time both before and after Trip 10 passed up its scheduled landing there.
