raise money by an agreement with the southern cities of Germany, promising them religious liberty. In January, 1547, the Pope withdrew his contingent, the six months for which he had promised it having expired. He was intriguing with the French. In March, 1547, the Council was removed to Bologna, and the Spanish Bishops refused to follow, while Charles refused to recognise a Council at Bologna. The victory of Mühlberg, April 23, 1547, made Charles' position still more formidable. An actual rupture between the Pope and the Emperor seemed probable, suggested not only by fear of Charles' exorbitant position in Europe, but by minor Italian interests.
The solidity of Spanish power in the Italian peninsula was apparent especially at this juncture. Ferrante de Gonzaga, who had been named as Governor of Milan in 1546, though the appointment proved unfortunate, secured at least the support of Mantua. The Venetian policy grew more and more cautious, and the greater this caution the greater the difficulty of disturbing existing arrangements. The policy of Ercole II of Ferrara was almost equally prudent. Cosimo de' Medici showed himself the faithful servant of Charles, and in view of his watchful guardianship troubles at Lucca and Siena might pass almost unnoticed. Naples was in the firm hands of Toledo. Doria seemed safe at Genoa, and could be absolutely trusted. Only the Pope showed inclinations to disturb the settled order, in the interests of his greedy Farnese family. And so long as the other factors remained unchanged he was powerless for serious harm. But in Italy revolutions were always possible.
The remarkable enterprise of Francesco Burlamacchi directed from Lucca against Florence with the aid of the Strozzi failed miserably (1546). A more dangerous conspiracy was set on foot in Genoa by Gianluigi Fiesco. Gianluigi, moved by the loss of his own property, jealous of the power of the Doria, and taking advantage of the discontent of the people with the constitution of 1528, which gave all the power to the old nobility, had long since entered into relations with France for the overthrow of the Doria, and the Spanish power resting upon them. The possession of Genoa was the key to the peninsula, and the wealth of the Genoese capitalists a mainstay of Charles. On the other hand the immense debts owed by Charles to the Ligurian financiers secured for him the support of the moneyed interest, but could hardly prevent a sudden stroke of force. The Pope allowed Fiesco to arrange for the purchase of four of his own galleys, at that time lying in! Ci vita Vecchia (1546). The Pope's relations with Doria were far from friendly, apart from any animus against the Emperor.
The time fixed for the attempt was the night of January a, 1547. At ten o'clock the conspirators, who had a galley and 300 foot-soldiers at their disposal, issued from the palace of Fiesco in three bands. Fiesco himself with one made for Doria's galleys, seized them, and in the
