any paper other than the obligations of well-known German merchants. At the critical moment Francis could not get credit. The Swabian League forbade the merchants of Augsburg to accept his bills. He endeavoured in vain to raise money in Genoa and in Lyons.
It is needless to pursue the base intrigues and tergiversations of the several Electors. The Elector of Saxony played the most honourable part, for he refused to be a candidate himself, and declined all personal gratification. The Elector of Mainz showed himself perhaps the most greedy and unfaithful. He received 100, 000 florins from Charles alone and the promise of a pension of 10, 000, which it is satisfactory to note was not regularly paid. Money on the one hand, and popular pressure on the other decided the issue. The Bhinelands, where the possessions of four Electors lay and where the election was to take place, were enthusiastic for the Habsburg candidature. It was here that the national idea was strongest, and the humanists were eloquent in their support of Maximilian's grandson. The army of the Swabian League, under Franz von Sickingen, the great German condottiere, was ready to act on behalf of Charles; it had been recently engaged in evicting the Duke Ulrich of Württemberg from his dominions, and was now secured by Charles for three months for his own service. Here also money had its value. Sickingen and the Swabian League received 171, 000 florins. At the end the Pope gave way and withdrew his opposition. On June 28, 1519, the Electors at Frankfort voted unanimously for the election of Charles. The election cost him 850, 000 florins.
It is a commonplace of historians to exclaim at the fruitless waste of energy involved in this electoral struggle, and to point out that Charles was not richer or more powerful as Emperor than he was before; while on the other hand his obligations and anxieties were considerably increased. But so long as prestige plays its part in human affairs, so long a reasonable judgment will justify the ambition of Charles. He was still perhaps in the youthful frame of mind which willingly and ignorantly courts responsibility and faces risks, the frame of mind in which he entered on his first war with Francis, saying, "Soon he will be a poor King or I shall be a poor Emperor." But the imperial s Crown was in some sort hereditary in his race. Had he pusillanimously refused it, his prestige must have suffered severely. As a German prince he could not brook the interference of a foreign and a hostile power in the affairs of Germany. The imperial contest was inevitable, and was in fact the peaceful overture to another contest, equally inevitable, and more enduring, waged over half a continent, through nearly forty years.
War was in fact inevitable, and Charles was ill-prepared to meet it. His affairs in Spain went slowly, and it was not until May, 1520, that Charles was able to sail for the north, leaving open revolt at Valencia, and discontent in his other dominions. The fortunate issue of these
