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1777] Burgoyne in difficulties. 215 were fighting not against an organised army, needing fixed bases of supply with regular communication, but against an armed population only wanting local pressure to call them into activity. As Burgoyne advanced, recruits kept pouring into the enemy's force from the farm- steads of Connecticut and New York, hardy and skilful marksmen, well fitted for the irregular, backwoods fighting which was before them. The American army was under the command of Gates. His military capacity was that of a second-rate and commonplace European soldier. Happily for the American cause he had under him Arnold, Morgan, and Stark, three subordinates not only of extraordinary daring, but also possessing a full comprehension of the task before them and of the special qualifications of their troops. To secure his line of march, Burgoyne threw out two strong flanking bodies, one to the north-east to act in Vermont, the other up the valley of the Mohawk in New York. With strange lack of judgment, and in defiance of the remonstrances of his ablest subordinate, General Fraser, Burgoyne chose for the former task a German regiment, known to be slow marchers and certain to be hindered by their ignorance of English. They were met by Starke at Bennington and defeated, losing their commanding officer and their artillery. A second German force, sent to support them, fared no better. The discomfiture of the force in the Mohawk valley under Colonel St Leger was less conspicuous and less humiliating, but hardly less complete in its practical effects. In his first encounter with the Americans at Oriskany he was successful. But the main object of the expedition, the reduction of Fort Stanwix, was frustrated by the desertion of the Indian allies, the lack of siege artillery, and the unexpected arrival of Arnold with a relieving force of 2000 men. On September 13 and 14 Burgoyne crossed the Hudson near Saratoga and advanced along the right bank. There on September 19 he was attacked, losing about 600 men and inflicting equal loss on the enemy. In the meantime the Americans had thrown a force across Burgoyne's rear, which intercepted his supplies at the foot of Lake George, while at the same time they made an unsuccessful attack on Ticonderoga. Burgoyne's position was now deplorable. His Indian allies deserted in a body. His horses were dying for lack of forage. There were no tidings of any British force advancing from the north. Yet the bare possibility that Clinton might be on his way forbade him to retreat, while every day's delay made retreat more hopeless. All that he could do was to entrench himself, and hold out as long as supplies lasted, in the faint hope that the advance of Clinton or some unlooked-for turn of events might bring relief. On October 6 Burgoyne decided to retreat, and, with a view to clearing the way for his main army, advanced with a detachment of 1500 men against the enemy's lines. The Americans, however, acted on the offensive. Burgoyne was driven back within his CH. VII.