Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/264

.232 Recognition of Independence. [1732-3 ^General Elliot, had materially altered the situation, and brought hopes of a not dishonourable peace. The changes of Ministry during 1782, the transfer of power from North to Rockingham, from Rockingham to Shelburne, and from Shelburne to the Coalition Ministry, count for little in the history of the negotiations with America. Though no definitive treaty could be signed unless France were a party to it, yet informal negotiations were carried on at Paris during 1782, .in which the United States were represented by Franklin and John Adams, the British government by Richard Oswald, a man of business in London who was in the confidence of Lord Shelburne, and who had been on friendly terms with Franklin in England. The main point of difficulty was the compensation of loyalists for losses inflicted on them by the Americans. The difficulty of arranging any such scheme of compensation lay in the fact that Congress had no effective authority over the various States ; and finally the claim was abandoned. On November 30, 1782, a provisional treaty was signed, to become actually operative as soon as peace was made between Great Britain and the allies of America. The treaty fully acknowledged the independence of the United States ; it fixed boundaries which included the whole existing territory of the thirteen colonies; and it gave them unlimited expansion westward. The navigation of the Mississippi and the use of the Newfoundland fisheries were to be shared by Great Britain and the United States ; and Congress was to endeavour to secure from the various State- governments the restitution of land which was the property of British subjects who had not borne arms. Negotiations with Spain and France were so long delayed that it was not till September 3, 1783, that these provisional articles were embodied in a formal treaty. A few words may be added as to the causes which had brought about a result so disastrous to Great Britain. These causes were in part military, in part political. Of the former some were due to what may fairly be called accidental conditions ; others were inherent in the nature of the problem. England was at the time undoubtedly suffering from an exceptional lack of competent Generals. The comprehensive view and fiery promptness of Wolfe, or the resourcefulness of Clive, would now have been invaluable but were wholly wanting. Moreover British discipline and equipment were totally unsuited to the task imposed upon the army. Burgoyne^s expedition is typical. Speed and mobility were all-essential. The British troops were encumbered with heavy artillery and transport, and they laboured under the weight and hindrance of elaborate uniforms. Moreover the tactics learnt in Europe were applied by British commanders to a country where the conditions were wholly different, in a war in which skilled marksmen, using what in comparison with their opponents' arms were weapons of precision,