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256 Argument from experience and history. [i?87 Madison was disposed to concur in any plan, consistent with funda- mental principles, for removing the difficulty in question ; but equality was neither just nor necessary. Those who asked for equality, on the ground of the equality of sovereign States, had confused the effect of treaty-making pure and simple, with compacts for other purposes, such as raising money or troops. France might enter into treaty with the Prince of Monaco for the regulation of commerce, upon a footing of equality ; but would the millions of France submit their fortunes to the thousands of Monaco in the matter of raising money or troops? Why were countries represented in proportion to numbers? Was it because the representatives were chosen by the people themselves ? The same would be true of the representatives in the national legislature. Was it because the larger had more at stake than the smaller ? The same would be true of the larger and smaller States. Was it because the laws operated immediately upon persons and property ? The same was true in some degree under the Confederation; the same would be true generally under the plan in question. That equality was not necessary he considered equally true. Was a combination of the large States dreaded ? Their interests were not common, and equality in size was no reason for combining. The journals of Congress did not show any tendency that way. Contention rather than combination was likely, if they could judge from the experience of other countries. Carthage and Rome tore each other to pieces, instead of uniting to devour weaker nations ; Austria and France were hostile so long as they remained the greatest powers of Europe. England and France had now succeeded to pre-eminence and to mutual enmity, and America had gained its liberty in consequence. Were the large States, singly, dangerous to the smaller States ? Then the latter ought to desire a government strong enough to control the former. Here again experience was instructive. What was the situation of minor sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which the more powerful were under no control except that of the law of nations ? Was not the danger to the weak in proportion to their weakness ? Let them note the position of the weaker members of the Amphictyonic Council. What was the condition of the minor States in the Germanic Confederacy ? They owed such safety as they had partly to enlisting under the rival banners of the great members, partly to alliances with neighbouring princes, where such were not prohibited. Two extremes were before the Convention, a perfect separation, and a perfect incorporation of the thirteen States. By the first, they would be independent nations, subject to no external law but the law of nations; by the second, they would be mere counties of one entire Republic, subject to one common law. By the first, the smaller States would have everything to fear from the larger ; by the second, nothing. The true policy for the smaller States therefore lay in promoting a form of government which would most nearly place the States upon the footing