Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/309

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1787] Negative of State legislation. 277 government of the individual States in any matters of internal police which respect the government of such States only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is not concerned." In explanation the mover read an enumeration of powers which he conceived to fall within the meaning of the provision, this enumeration not including direct taxation a fact which was noticed and commented upon. The motion failed, two States only voting for it. The following provision was now substituted by the House for the remainder of the clause after the words " to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation " which words themselves were not disturbed : " and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are severally incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation." And then, with this amendment, the whole clause was adopted, two States, South Carolina and Georgia, voting in the negative. The clause giving to the legislature power to negative State legislation was now taken up, and disposed of on the same day. Sherman thought it an unnecessary power ; the Courts of the States, he said, would not uphold laws which contravened the authority of the Union. Martin, also opposing the idea, inquired whether all the laws of the States were to be sent up to the general government before they could take effect. Madison, on the other hand, argued that the negative in question was essential to the efficacy and security of the general government. The necessity of a general government arose from the propensity of the States to pursue their particular interests, in opposition to the general interest. That propensity would continue to disturb the system unless effectually controlled ; nor would anything short of a negative control it. The States would pass laws to accomplish their harmful purposes before they could be repealed by the national legislature or set aside by the national tribunals. Alluding, it seems, to the remark of Sherman con- cerning State Courts, he said that confidence could not be put in the State tribunals as guardians of the national authority. In Georgia the judges were appointed annually ; in Rhode Island judges who had refused to enforce an unconstitutional statute were removed and others put in their place by the legislature, who would obey their masters. The power to negative bad laws was the mildest and also the most certain means of preserving the harmony of the system. He referred to the British system ; nothing could maintain the harmony and subordina- tion of the various parts of the empire but the prerogative by which in rery part the Crown stifled in the birth every Act tending towards discord encroachment. The prerogative had, it was true, been misapplied sometimes, through ignorance or partiality ; but there was not the same >n for fear in the present case. As for sending all laws up to CH. VIII.