Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/330

298 Appointment of judges. [i?87 that appointment might be made by the executive, with concurrence of a third of the Senate; this plan would unite responsibility in the executive with security against incautious or corrupt nominations. Sherman said that the Senate would be composed of men nearly equal in ability to the executive ; together the senators would bring more wisdom and wider knowledge of men. And it would not be so easy for can- didates to intrigue with them as with the executive. There was in the question again more or less feeling in regard to the influence of the smaller States, for in the Senate they were to have an equal voice with the rest. Randolph accordingly observed that, when the appointment of the judges had been given to the Senate, equality of suffrage there had not yet been given. Still he would leave the appoint- ment there rather than give it to the executive. He thought that the advantage of personal responsibility might be had in the Senate by requiring the names of those voting to be entered in the journal. He too thought it would be an advantage that senators would come from all the States. The motion for appointment by the executive was lost; only Massachusetts and Pennsylvania voting for it. Gorham now moved the adoption of the Massachusetts plan appointment by the executive with advice and consent of the Senate. The motion, taken at once, was lost ; four States, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, voting for it, four against it, others now absent, or not voting. The question then went over until July 21, when a motion, made by Madison before the postponement, was taken up, that the judges be nominated by the executive, the nomination to become appointment unless disagreed to by two-thirds, afterwards changed to a majority, of the Senate. Madison argued, first, that this would secure responsibility in the matter ; secondly, that it would defeat gross partiality or mistake in the nomination; thirdly, that it was required by the principle adopted in other cases concurrence of two authorities in one of which the people, in the other the States, should be represented. If the second branch alone should have the appointment of the judges, they might be appointed by a minority of the people though by a majority of the States. Moreover it would throw the appointment entirely into the hands of the northern States. Ellsworth opposed and Gouverneur Morris favoured the motion. Ellsworth might be willing to allow the executive a veto upon a nomination by the Senate, subject to being overruled by two-thirds of the senators, but he preferred absolute appointment by the Senate. Increase of power in the executive would be disliked by the people. Morris said, first, that the States would often have an interest in the choice of judges, hence the Senate, where the States were to vote, should not appoint ; secondly, that the executive, in the necessary intercourse with every part of the country, would or might have better information than the Senate ;