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1862] The Northern army lands in the peninsula. 473 Rapidan. Had McClellan, as directed by the President's first War Order, moved against it on February 22, as he might have done with double numbers, he could have won an easy and invaluable victory. Under the new conditions the four corps-commanders met in a council of war on March 13, and decided in favour of the route by way of Fortress Monroe. McClellan adopted the plan ; and it was also accepted by the President, with the conditions that Manassas should be occupied and permanently held, and Washington City be left entirely secure. "Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac" wrote the Secretary of War, communicating the President's decision, "choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or at all events, move such remainder of the army at once, in pursuit of the enemy, by some route."" Preparations for a movement by water had already been set on foot. The troops began their embarcation on March 17, and on April 5 the officer charged with the duty reported that he had transported to Fortress Monroe an army of 121,500 men with "all their animals, waggons, batteries, pontoon bridges and other impedimenta. General McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe on April 2 to lead his army up the Peninsula between the York and James rivers. Had he pursued the prompt and vigorous march he originally contem- plated, he would have found no Confederate forces between him and Richmond capable of resisting the greatly superior army under his command. But from this point his campaign took on the double character of a fault-finding correspondence with the President and Secretary of War, and a feeble and hesitating advance; an approach that was more defensive than aggressive, giving the enemy ample time to concentrate their scattered detachments into a formidable army that successfully warded off the threatened loss of their capital, and finally caused the whole expeditionary force to be withdrawn. The two things of which McClellan chiefly complained, viz. that McDowell's corps was temporarily withheld, and that the navy did not render him expected help, were due to his own neglect of the President's positive injunction, approved by his own council of war, that he should leave Washington secure. Instead of the 55,000 men needed for the Washington forts, and a covering force, he had left behind only 18,000; and this neglect rendered imperative the temporary retention of McDowell, the greater portion of whose corps was however finally sent to McClellan. The promise that the navy should co-operate existed only in his own imagination. He had neither stipulated for this, nor had he received any promise of the specific work which he now declared it should have accomplished. Besides answering the general's complaints, President Lincoln con- tinually admonished him to push his campaign with serious energy. "And once more let me tell you," he wrote to him on April 9, "it is in- dispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. CH. XV.