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1862] Moral collapse of McClellan. 479 enemy." But this courageous mood did not last long. A little past midnight, reporting the fighting of the 27th, he wrote to the Secretary of War in an uncontrollable emotion of despair and insubordination, "I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."" There was no occasion for the general's absurd panic. On the 26th his troops had won a splendid victory. On the 27th, though with great loss, they had firmly held their ground against heavy odds. On the 28th they had, by the testimony of eminent Confederate leaders, an advantage of position which, properly used, would have made them masters of Richmond in a single day. On the 29th and 30th they more than held their own, and on July 1 they won a victory at Malvern Hill that shattered the Confederate army. It was only the discouragement of their commander that caused their retreat to the shelter of the Union gunboats at Harrison's Landing on the James river. The President was less alarmed at the reported disaster to the army, than at the utter collapse of McClellan's courage and hope. He sent him a kind message to save his army at all events, and hurried reinforce- ments to him from all available points. Further news soon made it evident that there was no immediate danger, for Lee had withdrawn his crippled army to Richmond. For the President, however, the crisis had a wider import, and he now took prompt measures to meet it. It was plain that an error had been committed when in April the recruiting of the armies was stopped. Additional forces were needed east and west, and that speedily. The President sent Secretary Seward to New York with a letter addressed to the governors of the loyal States setting forth the military situation, and adding: "Rather than hazard the misapprehension of our military condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troops by proclamation, I have deemed it best to address you in this form. To accomplish the object stated we require, without delay, 150,000 men, including those recently called for by the Secretary of War. Thus reinforced, our gallant army will be enabled to realise the hopes and expectations of the government and the people." With this he also addressed to Secretary Seward another letter, to be shown confidentially to the governors, containing one of the most impressive official declarations of his whole administration. "I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force, were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard is it