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1864] Cold Harbour. Grant's change of plan. 619 Sheridan with energy and fought him with courage. The casualties were severe and probably equal the Confederates suffering the heaviest loss, however, in their commander, General Stuart, who was mortally wounded six miles from Richmond on the 10th. Lee, having entrenched himself behind the North Anna on May 20, completely checkmated Grant's endeavour to dislodge him when the Federals crossed on the 23rd. Grant, however, skilfully drew back to the north side, and again moving by the left marched down thirty-two miles to Hanovertown, where his advance-guard crossed the Pamunkey on May 27. Thus far, the mere fighting and losses of the two armies gave no indications of decisive results, but other considerations pointed to the approaching end. Since Grant had double the numbers of his antagonist, Lee's loss was relatively much the more damaging. Besides, Lee had been compelled constantly to retreat. But the greatest difference lay in the augury which Grant drew from the spirit of the opposing forces. In his report of May 26 to Washington, announcing his intention to cross the Pamunkey at Hanovertown, he wrote: "Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakeably. A battle with them outside of entrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the moral over the enemy, and attack with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already ensured." This success was not destined to come as soon as Grant evidently hoped. With almost continual fighting from the 27th, when he began crossing the Pamunkey, he pushed his army forward to Cold Harbour, which Sheridan's cavalry had seized on the 81st, and successfully held until reinforcements came up. Heavy assaults on June 1 and 2 carried some of the advanced Confederate entrenchments, and encouraged Grant to believe that he could break Lee's army by another frontal attack. It turned out to be an ill-advised and costly experiment. The assault was made at half past four o'clock on the morning of June 3, and though the heroic soldiers gained the first rifle pits, in a single hour 4000 veterans lay dead or wounded under the direct and cross fire of the well-prepared Confederate works, raising the total casualties for the first twelve days of June to near 10,000. Grant's official report frankly acknowledges the serious nature of the reverse. "It was the only general attack," he writes, " made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses." From this point dates an entire change in Grant's plan of campaign.

  • 'I now find," he wrote to Washington on June 5, "after more than

thirty days of trial, that the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am CH. XVI.