and time provided for appeal from a judgment in a civil action." Therefore, we agree with the Bankses that this appeal is not governed by Rule 6-9.
We next address the Bartons' motion to dismiss the Bankses' appeal filed on December 20, 2017, in which they argue that the Bankses' appeal should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Rule 6-9, based on the arguments just discussed. Because the appeal is not governed by Rule 6-9, the Bartons' argument has no merit. To the extent that this motion also argues that the Bankses' October 2, 2017 notice of appeal failed to designate the court’s order dismissing the Bankses' petition for adoption, we disagree. The Bankses' first and second notices of appeal both specifically mention the denial of their petition for adoption as well as the court's order granting the Bartons' petition for adoption.
On May 18, 2018, the Bartons filed a motion to strike the "appellee's brief" filed by DHS. The Bartons argue that DHS neither appealed nor cross-appealed, and that its brief was filed after the deadline for appellants' briefs (abiding instead by the deadline for appellees' briefs), but that DHS argues in favor of the appellants and asks this court to reverse the circuit court's orders. The Bartons argue that DHS cannot seek affirmative relief from the appellate court without abiding by the rules applicable to an appealing party, and the Bartons point out that they have had no opportunity to respond to the arguments in DHS's brief because, as co-appellees, there is no mechanism for them to do so. In response, DHS argues that (1) it has previously filed appellees' briefs in numerous other cases in which it argued in favor of the appellants without issue, and (2) it is a party to the action, and its consent is required for adoption. It also argues that the Bartons' motion is unsupported by persuasive precedent and lacks a memorandum of authorities.
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