While it is true that DHS cites numerous cases in which it filed an appellee's brief but argued in favor of the appellant, none of the cited cases address the propriety of that practice. DHS has provided us with no persuasive argument or authority for why it should be exempt from the standard rules of appellate procedure applicable to all other litigants. Moreover, its argument that it is a party to the case whose input is extremely important is not persuasive. DHS was free to file a notice of appeal or cross-appeal, especially since, in this case, its role in withholding consent to the adoption was directly at issue. In keeping with our recent opinion in Washington County Regional Medical Center, we grant the motion and strike DHS's brief.
Finally, we turn to the Bartons' motion to strike the portions of the Bankses' reply brief that incorporate arguments first raised by DHS in its appellee's brief. Although we are granting the motion to strike DHS's brief, as discussed above, we see no need to strike those portions of the Bankses' reply brief raising arguments not originally raised in its opening brief. It is well settled that we do not consider any arguments not raised in an appellant's opening brief. See Stacks v. Marks, 354 Ark. 594, 600, 127 S.W.3d 483, 486 (2003). Therefore, the Bartons' motion is essentially moot because the Bankses are limited to the arguments that were preserved below and presented in their opening brief on appeal. Further relief is unnecessary, and we therefore deny the motion.
We now address the merits of the Bankses' appeal. Under Arkansas law, a party is required to prove two things to succeed with respect to his or her petition to adopt a child: (1) that all necessary consents to the adoption have been obtained or waived, and (2) that clear and convincing evidence proved that their adoption of the child is in the child's best
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