the ten-day period" to have different meanings in two separate subsections of section 9-9-209. We have repeatedly held that adoption statutes are strictly construed, Newkirk, 2016 Ark. App. 186, at 8–9, 486 S.W.3d at 832–33, and the clear language of subsection 209(b)(3) indicates that a consenting party may elect to waive the ten-day waiting period in favor of a five-day period but not less.
Moreover, DHS never elected to waive the ten-day waiting period in this case. While subsection 209(b)(3) mandates that the waiver information be included in the language of the consent, the consent form executed by DHS says nothing about waiver. Despite the Bankses' insistence that DHS asked the court to waive the ten-day period at the hearing, it did not. DHS was represented at the hearing by counsel who stated, "I think the Department's position has been for quite some time, even before the termination of parental rights, that the child should be placed with the Banks[es]. I think the Department has executed a consent for the Banks[es] to adopt. I mean, the Department prefers the Banks[es] at this point." At no point during the hearing did counsel for DHS request that the court waive the waiting period, despite the fact that the court stated numerous times from the bench, "I don’t think I can waive the time requirement unless I’m asked to waive it, and nobody’s asked to waive it." The only party who orally requested waiver of the ten-day waiting period was counsel for the Bankses. However, the Bankses were not legally entitled to consent to the adoption, nor were they legally authorized to waive the ten-day withdrawal period for that consent.
It is clear that, at the time of the hearing, the Bankses' petition for adoption did not meet the statutory requirements set out in section 9-9-214(c). The question is then whether
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