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THE JUDGE AS A LEGISLATOR

other. That is the great truth in Savigny's theory of its origin. But law is also a conscious or purposed growth, for the expression of customary morality will be false unless the mind of the judge is directed to the attainment of the moral end and its embodiment in legal forms.[1] Nothing less than conscious effort will be adequate if the end in view is to prevail. The standards or patterns of utility and morals will be found by the judge in the life of the community. They will be found in the same way by the legislator. That does not mean, however, that the work of the one any more than that of the other is a replica of nature's forms.

There has been much debate among foreign jurists whether the norms of right and useful conduct, the patterns of social welfare, are to be found by the judge in conformity with an objective or a subjective standard. Opposing schools of thought have battled for each view.[2] At times,

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  1. Cf. Gény, op. cit., vol. I, p. 263, sec. 92.
  2. For a clear and interesting summary, see Brütt, supra, p. 101, et seq.; cf. Gény, op. cit., vol. I, p. 221; and contrast Flavius, op. cit., p. 87.