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THE JUDGE AS A LEGISLATOR

tion, and in order to escape the dangers of arbitrary action, to disengage himself, so far as possible, of every influence that is personal or that comes from the particular situation which is presented to him, and base his judicial decision on elements of an objective nature. And that is why the activity which is proper to him has seemed to me capable of being justly qualified: free scientific research, libre recherche scientifique: free, since it is here removed from the action of positive authority; scientific, at the same time, because it can find its solid foundations only in the objective elements which science alone is able to reveal to it."[1]

The rationale of the modern viewpoint has been admirably expressed by Vander Eycken[2] in his "Méthode positive de l'Interprétation juridique":[3] "Formerly men looked upon law as the product of the conscious will of the legislator. Today they see in it a natural force.

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  1. Ehrlich has the same thought, "Die juristische Logik," p. 312.
  2. Professor in the University of Brussels.
  3. P. 401, sec. 239.