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THE JUDGE AS A LEGISLATOR

in little more than name.[1] The law of nature is no longer conceived of as something static and eternal. It does not override human or positive law. It is the stuff out of which human or positive law is to be woven, when other sources fail.[2] "The modern philosophy of law comes in contact with the natural law philosophy in that the one as well as the other seeks to be the science of the just. But the modern philosophy of law departs essentially from the natural law philosophy in that the latter seeks a just, natural law outside of positive law, while the new philosophy of law desires to deduce and is the element of the just in and out of the positive law—out of what it is and of what it is becoming. The natural law school seeks an absolute, ideal law, ‘natural law,’ the law κατ’ ἐξοχήν, by the side of which positive law has only secondary importance. The

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  1. Pound, 25 Harvard L. R. 162; Charmont, "La Renaissance du droit naturel," passim; also transl., 7 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, 106, 11; Demogue, "Analysis of Fundamental Notions," 7 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 373, sec. 212; Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," p. 64.
  2. Vander Eycken, op. cit., p. 401.