plants subjective reason.”[1] We may figure the task of the judge, if we please, as the task of a translator, the reading of signs and symbols given from without. None the less, we will not set men to such a task, unless they have absorbed the spirit, and have filled themselves with a love, of the language they must read.
I have no quarrel, therefore, with the doctrine that judges ought to be in sympathy with the spirit of their times. Alas! assent to such a generality does not carry us far upon the road to truth. In every court there are likely to be as many estimates of the “Zeitgeist” there are judges on its bench. Of the power of favor or prejudice in any sordid or vulgar or evil sense, I have found no trace, not even the faintest, among the judges whom I have known. But every day there is borne in on me a new conviction of the inescapable relation between the truth with- out us and the truth within. The spirit of the age, as it is revealed to each of us, is too often only
- ↑ Gény, op. cit., vol. II, p. 93, sec. 159; vol. II, p. 142, sec. 168; also Flavius, p. 43.
