Page:Cardozo-Nature-Of-The-Judicial-Process.pdf/32

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
INTRODUCTION

better right. All sorts of deflecting forces may appear to contest its sway and absorb its power. At least, it is the heir presumptive. A pretender to the title will have to fight his way.

Great judges bave sometimes spoken as if the principle of philosophy, i.e., of logical development, meant little or nothing in our law. Probably none of them in conduct was ever true to such a faith. Lord Halsbury said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901, A. C. 495, 506: "A case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.[1]All this may be true, but we must not press the truth too far. Logical consistency does not cease to be a good because it is not the supreme good. Holmes has told us

32
  1. Cf. Bailbache, J., in Belfast Ropewalk Co. v. Bushell, 1918, I K. B. 210, 213: "Unfortunately or fortunately, I am not sure which, our law is not a science."