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THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY

infringement, material and moral, of my rights."[1]Everyone feels the force of this sentiment when two cases are the same. Adherence to precedentmust then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handedadministration of justice in the courts. A sentiment like in kind, though different in degree, is at the root of the tendency of precedent to extend itself along the lines of logical development.[2]No doubt the sentiment is powerfully reinforced by what is often nothing but an intellectual passion for elegantia juris, for symmetry of form and substance. [3]That is an ideal which can never fail to exert some measure of attraction upon the professional experts who make up the lawyer class. To the Roman lawyers, it meant much, more than it has meantto English lawyers or to ours, certainly more

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  1. W. G. Miller, "The Data of Jurisprudence," p. 335; cf. Gray, "Nature and Sources of the Law," sec. 420; Salmond, "Jurisprudence," p. 170.
  2. Cf. Gény, "Méthode d'Interprétation et Sources en droit privé positif," vol. II, p. 119.
  3. W. G. Miller, supra, p. 281; Bryce, "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," vol. II, p. 629.