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HISTORY, TRADITION AND SOCIOLOGY

such that the court will require evidence of their existence.[1] The master in the discharge of his duty to protect the servant against harm must exercise the degree of care that is commonly exercised in like circumstance by men of ordinary prudence. The triers of the facts in determining whether that standard has been attained, must consult the habits of life, the everyday beliefs and practices, of the men and women about them. Innumerable, also, are the cases where the course of dealing to be followed is defined by the customs, or, more properly speaking, the usages, of a particular trade or market or profession.[2] The constant assumption runs throughout the law that the natural and spontaneous evolutions of habit fix the limits of right and wrong. A slight extension of custom identifies it with customary morality, the prevailing standard of right conduct, the mores of the time.[3] This is the point

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  1. First Nat. Bank v. Farson, 226 N. Y. 218.
  2. Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 513; Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464; 2 Williston on Contracts, sec. 649
  3. Cf. Gény, op. cit., vol. I, p. 319, sec. 110.