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HISTORY, TRADITION AND SOCIOLOGY

those that use it, I have chosen in its stead a term which, if not precise enough for the philosopher, will at least be found sufficiently definite and inclusive to suit the purposes of the judge.

It is true, I think, today in every department of the law that the social value of a rule has become a test of growing power and importance. This truth is powerfully driven home to the lawyers of this country in the writings of Dean Pound. "Perhaps the most significant advance in the modern science of law is the change from the analytical to the functional attitude."[1] "The emphasis has changed from the content of the precept and the existence of the remedy to the effect of the precept in action and the availability and efficiency of the remedy to attain the ends for which the precept was devised."[2] Foreign jurists have the same thought: "The whole of the judicial function," says Gmelin,[3]

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  1. Pound, "Administrative Application of Legal Standards," Proceedings American Bar Association, 1919, pp. 441, 449.
  2. Ibid., p. 451; cf. Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Columbia L. R. 603.
  3. "Sociological Method," transl., 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 131.