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tion."^[1] The century had not closed, however, before a new political philosophy became reflected in the work of statesmen and ultimately in the decrees of courts. The transition is interestingly described by Dicey in his "Law and Opinion in England."^[2] "The movement from individualistic liberalism to unsystematic collectivism” had brought changes in the social order which carried with them the need of a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties. In our country, the need did not assert itself so soon. Courts still spoke in the phrases of a philosophy that had served its day.^[3] Gradually, however, though not without frequent protest and intermittent movements backward, a new conception of the significance of constitutional limitations in the domain of individual liberty, emerged to recognition and to dominance. Judge Hough, in an interesting address, finds the dawn

1. Pound, "Juristic Science and The Law," 31 Harvard L. R. 1047, 1048.
2. Cf. Duguit, supra.
3. Haines, "The Law of Nature in Federal Decisions," 25 Yale L. J. 617.