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HISTORY, TRADITION AND SOCIOLOGY

must also underlie the cognate notion of equality. No state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws."[1] Restrictions, viewed narrowly, may seem to foster inequality. The same restrictions, when viewed broadly, may be seen "to be necessary in the long run in order to establish the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract begins."[2] Charmont in "La Renaissance du droit naturel,"[3] gives neat expression to the same thought: "On tend à considerer qu'il n'y a pas de contrat respectable si les parties n'ont pas été placées dans les conditions non seulement de liberté, mais d'égalité. Si l'un des contractants est sans abri, sans ressources, condamné à subir les exigences de l'autre, la liberté de fait est supprimée."[4]

From all this, it results that the content of

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  1. U. S. Const., 14th Amendment.
  2. Holmes, J., dissenting in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27.
  3. Montpellier, Coulet et fils., éditeurs, 1910.
  4. "There is now a tendency to consider no contract worthy of respect unless the parties to it are in relations, not only of liberty, but of equality. If one of the parties be without defense or resources, compelled to comply with the demands of the other, the result is a suppression of true freedom."—Charmont, supra, p. 172; transl. in 7 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, P. 110, sec. 83.