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HISTORY, TRADITION AND SOCIOLOGY

Here as so often in the law, "the standard of conduct is external, and takes no account of the personal equation of the man concerned."[1] "The interpreter,” says Brütt,[2] "must above all things put aside his estimate of political and legislative values, and must endeavor to ascertain in a purely objective spirit what ordering of the social life of the community comports best with the aim of the law in question in the circumstances before him.” Some fields of the law there are, indeed, where there is freer scope for subjective vision. Of these we shall say more hereafter. The personal element, whatever its scope in other spheres, should have little, if any, sway in determining the limits of legislative power. One department of the government may not force upon another its own standards of propriety. "It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as courts."[3]

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  1. The Germanic, 196 U. S. 589, 596.
  2. "Die Kunst der Rechtsanwendung,' p. 57.
  3. Missouri, K. & T. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270; People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154. 173.