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old castle, donations enriched them, and many ex-
emptions and privileges were granted by ecclesiastical
and secular authorities, especially by Innocent III,
Honorius III, and Emperor Frederick II. Three
foundations were made, Hohenfurth in Bohemia,
Engelszell and Saiisenstein in Austria.
This state continued until the revolt of Luther and the many wars of those times caused severe losses Ijoth in subjects and income. When the first imperial abljot was appointed (1568) there were but three monks and two novices in the community. In 1587, however, Alexander was nominated abbot, and he inaugurated reform in regular observance and tem- poral administration and regained possession of much of the monastery's former property; he also recon- structed the monastic buildings. At the end of his rule there were twenty priests, four clerics, and one brother in the community (1641). In 1733 the mon- astery was destroyed by fire, but was immediately rebuilt under .\bbot Bonus Pomerl. It escaped being secularized during the period of Josephinism, though it had much to suffer during the persecution. After these troubles and the Napoleonic wars it prospered, and the buildings, as they stand to-day, were com- pleted; the church is particularly beautiful. The present and sixty-sixth abbot. Right Rev. Theobald Grasbock, was elected in 1892; this commuiiity num- bers thirty-nine priests and several clerics. The monks have care of thirty-two parishes besides other positions of importance.
StOlz. Gesch. des cisterc. Klosters Wilhering (Linz, 1840) ; Gbillnberger, Die dltesten Tadtenbucher des cist. Stifles Wil- hering (Graz, 1896) : Hardmuth, Die Abteien OberSsterreicb u. Salz- burg (Vienna, 18.58) ; Sartohius, Cistercium bis-tertium (Prague, 1700); Catalogus personarum religiosarum S. O. Cist. (Rome, 1906); BoETTCHER. Germania sacra (Leipzig. 1874); Manrique, Ang. Annales Cisterc. (Lyons, 1642); Jongeunus, Notitia .466a- tiarum Ord. Cister. (Cologne, 1640); Janauschek, Originum Cisterc, I (Vienna. 1877). EdmOND M. ObrECHT.
Will (Latin voluntas, Gr. /SoiiXijo-is, "willing", Ger. Wide, Fr. volontc). — This article treats of will in its psychological aspect.
The term will as used in Catholic philosophy, may be briefly defined as the faculty of choice; it is classified among the appetites, and is contrasted with those which belong either to the merely sensitive or to the vegetative order: it is thus commonly desig- nated "the rational appetite"; it stands in an author- itative relation to the complex of lower appetites, over which it exercises a preferential control; its specific act, therefore, when it is in full exercise, consists in selecting, by the light of reason, its object from among the various particular, conflicting aims of all the tendencies and faculties of our nature: its object is the good in general (bonum in communi); its prerogative is freedom in choosing among differ- ent forms of good. As employed in modern philoso- phy, the term has often a much wider signification. It is frequently used in a loose, generic sense as coex- tensive with appetite, and in such a way as to include any vital principle of movement ab intra, even those which are irrational and instinctive. Thus Bain makes appetency a species of volition, instead of vice-versa. We cannot but think this an abu.se of terms. In any case — whatever opinion one holds on the free will controversy — some specific designation is certainly recniired for that controlling and sovereign faculty in man, which cvitv >^:ine philosophy recog- nizes as unmistakably distinct from the purely pliysi- cal impulses and strivings, and from the sensuous de- sires and conations which arc the expressions of our lower nature's needs. And custom has consecrated the term will to this more honourable use.
Will and Knnwledgc. — The description of will, as understood in Catholic philosophy, given above, refers to the will in its fullest and most exijlicit exer- cise, the vohmlas deliberata or vuluntas ut voluntaii, as Saint Thomas speaks. There are, however, many
manifestations of will that are less complete than this.
Formal choice, preceded by methodical deliberation,
is not the only or the most frequent type of vohtion.
Most of our ordinary vohtion takes the form of
spontaneous and immediate reaction upon very simple
data. We have to deal with some narrow, concrete
situation; we aim at some end apprehended almost
without reflection and achieved almost at a stroke;
in such a case, will ex-presses itself along the lines of
least resistance through the subordinate agencies of
instinctive action, habit, or rule of thumb. Will, hke
the cognitive powers, originates in and is developed
by experience. This is expressed in the well-known
Scholastic axiom, "Nil volitum nisi pracoifnituni"
(Nothing can be willed which is not foreknown), taken
in conjunction with the other great generahzation
that all knowledge takes its rise in experience: "Nil
in inlelleclu quod non prius fuerit in sensu". All ap-
petition, according to this theory, emerges out of some
conscious state, which may be anything from a clear
and distinct perception or representation of an object,
to a mere vague feeling of want or discomfort, without
any distinct representation either of the object or the
means of satisfaction. The Aristot clean philosophers
did not neglect or ignore the significance of this latter
kind of consciousness (sometimes called affective). It
is true that here, as in deahng with the psychology of
other faculties, the Schoolmen did not attempt a
genetic account of the will, nor would they admit
continuity between the rational will and the lower
appetitive states; but in their theory of the passions,
they had worked out a very fair classification of the
main phenomena — a classification which has not been
substantially improved upon by any modern writer;
and they showed their appreciation of the close con-
nexion between will and emotions by treating both
under the general head of appetition. It is still a
debat cable question whether modern psychology', since
Kant, has not unnecessarily complicated the question
by introducing the triple division of functions into
knowledge, appetite, and feeling, in place of the
ancient bi-part it e division into knowledge and appetite.
The doctrine that will arises out of knowledge must not be pressed to mean that will is simply conditioned by knowledge, without in turn conditioning knowl- edge. The relation is not one-sided. "The mental functions interact, i. e. act reciprocally one upon another" (Sully), or, as Saint Thomas expresses it: "Voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt " (Summa theol., I, Q. xvi, a. 4 ad 1). Thus, an act of will is the usual condition of attention and of aU sustained ap- phcation of the cognitive faculties. This is recognized in common language. Again the Schoolmen were fond of describing the will as essentially a blind fac- ulty. This means simply that its function is prac- tice, not speculation, doing, not thinking (rersatur circa operabilia). But on the other hand they admitted that it was an integral part of reason — according to the Scotists indeed, the sujierior and nobler part, as being the supreme controller and mover ("Voluntas est motor in toto regno animx", Scotus). It is also represented as ruling and exercising command (im- perium) over the lower faculties. St. Thomas, how- ever, with his usual preference for the cognitive func- tion, puts the imprrium in the reason rather than the will {im peri II III ratiniii.'<). Hence arose disputes be- tween the Thomists and other schools, as to whether in the last resort the will was necessarily determined by the pra('lic;d judgment of the reason. The point, so hotly debated in the medieval schools, concerning the relative dignity of the two faculties, will and in- tellect, is perhaps insoluble; at all events it is not vital. The two interact so closely as to be almost inseparable. Hence Spinoza could say with some plausibility: "Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt".
Will and Feeling. — An act of will is generally con- ditioned not only by knowledge, but also by some
