ESSENCE
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ESSENCE
terms and exploded theories, they, on the other hand,
express opinions and make implicit admissions that
tell strongly against their own thesis. Indeed, it
would generally seem that these philosophers, to some
extent at least, misunderstand the position which they
attack, that they combat a sort of intuitive knowledge
of essences, erroneously supposed by them to be
claimed by Scholastics, and do not at all grasp the
theory of the natures of things as derived from a pains-
taking consideration of their characteristic properties.
Thus even Bain admits that there may in all proba-
bility be some one fundamental property to which all
the others might be referred; and he even uses the
words "real essence" to designate that property.
Mill tells us that "to penetrate to the more hidden
agreement on which these more obvious and super-
ficial agreements (the differentise leading to the great-
est number of interesting propria) depend, is often one
of the most difficult of scientific problems. And as it
is among the most difficult, so it seldom fails to be
among the most important". Father Rickaby in his
"General Metaphysics" gives the citations from both
Mill and Bain, as well as an important admission from
Comte, that the natural tendency of man is to inquire
for persistent types, a synonj-m, in this context, for
essences. The philosophical tradition, or school, to
which allusion is made — although we have antici-
pated its assertions by the admissions into which its
professors have allowed themselves to be drawn by the
exigencies of reason and hmnan language — may be
divided roughly into two main classes, with their repre-
sentatives in Locke and Mill. Locke got rid of the old
doctrine by making the "supposed essences" no more
than the bare significations of their names. He does
not, indeed, deny that there are real essences; on the
contrary, he fully admits this. But he asserts that
we are incapable of knowing more than the nominal or
logical essences which we form mentally for ourselves.
Mill, though, as we have seen, he occasionally aban-
dons his standpoint for one more in keeping with the
Scholastic view, professedly goes further than Locke
in utterly rejecting real essences, a rejection quite in
keeping with his general theory of knowledge, which
eliminates substance, causality, and necessary truth.
The considerations previously advanced will serve to indicate a line of argument used against scepticism in this matter. . The Scholastics do not and never have claimed any direct or perfect acquaintance with the intimate essences of all things. They recognize that, in very many cases, no more than an approximate knowledge can be obtained, and this only through accidental characteristics and consequently by a very indirect method. Still, though the existence of the concrete beings, of which the essences are in question, is contingent and mutable, himian knowledge, espe- cially in the field of mathematics, reaches out to the absolute and necessary. For example, the properties of a circle or triangle are deducible from its essence. That the one differs specifically from the other, and each from other figures, that their diverse antl neces- sary attributes, their characteristic properties, are dependent upon their several natures and can be in- ferred by a mathematical process from the.se — so much we know. The deductive character of certain geo- metrical proofs, proceeding from essential definitions, may at least be urged as an indication that the human mind is capable of grasping and of dealing with es- sences.
Similarly, and even from the admissions of the opponents of the Scholastic tradition given above, it may reasonably be maintained that we have a direct knowledge of essence, and also an indirect, or induc- tive knowledge of the physical natures existent in the world about us. The essences thus known do not necessarily point to the fact of existence ; they may or may not exist; but they certify to us what the things in question are. The knowledge and reality of v.— 35
essences emerges also from the doctrine of univer-
sals, which, although formally subjective in character,
are true expressions of the objective realities from
which they are abstracted. As Father Rickaby re-
marks: "In the rough the form of expression could
hardly be rejected, that science seeks to arrive at the
very nature of things and has some measure of suc-
cess in the enterprise"; and again, " In short, the very
admission that there is such a thing as physical sci-
ence, and that science is cogniiio rerum per causae — a
knowledge of things, according to the rationale of
them — is tantamount to saying that some manner
of acquaintance with essences is possible; that the
world does present its objects ranged according to at
least a certain number of different kinds, and that
we can do something to mark off one kind from an-
other." (General Metaphysics, c. III.)
Existence is that whereby the essence is an actuality in the line of being. By its actuation the essence is removed from the merely possible, is placed outside its causes, and exists in the world of actual things. St. Thomas describes it as the first or primary act of the essence as contrasted with its secondary act or opera- tion (I Sent., dist. xxxiii, Q. i, a. 1, ad 1) ; and again, as "the actuality of all form or nature" (Summa, I, Q. iii, a. 4). Whereas the essence or quiddity gives an an- swer to the question as to what the thing is, the exist- ence is the affirmative to the question as to whether it is. Thus, while created essences are divided into both possible and actual, existence is always actual and op- posed by its nature to simple potentiality. With re- gard to the existence of things, the question has been raised as to whether, in the ideal order, the possible is antecedent to the actual. The consideration here does not touch on the real or physical order, in which it is conceded liyScholastics that the potentiality of crea- tures precedes their actuality. The unique actuality, pure and simple (as against such theorists as von Hartmann, maintaining an ab.solute primitive poten- tiality of all existence), that necessarily precedes all potentiality, is that of God, in Whom essence and exist- ence are identical. We are concerned with the ques- tion: Is the concept of a possible entity prior to that of an e.xisting one? Rosmini answers this question in the affirmative. The School generally takes the opposite view, maintaining the thesis that the primitive idea is of existent entity — that is, essence as actualized and placed outside of its causes — in the concrete, though confused and indeterminate. Such an idea is of nar- row intension, but extensively it embraces all being. The thesis is supported by various considerations, such as that the essence is related to its existence as poten- tial to actual, that the act generally is prior to poten- tiality, and that this latter is known, and only known, through its corresponding actuality. Or, we know the possible being as that which may be, or may exist ; and this necessary relation to actual existence, without which the possible is not presented to the mind, indi- cates the priority, in the line of thought, of the actually existent over the merely possible. Existence is thus seen to be in some sense distinguished from the es- sence which it actuates.
The question agitated in the School arises at this point: What is the nature of the distinction that ob- tains between the physical essence and the existence of creatures? It is to be borne in mind that the con- troversy turns not upon a distinction between the merely po.ssible essence and the same essence as actu- alized, and thus physically existent; but on the far different and extremely nice point as to the nature of the distinction to be drawn between the actualized and physically existent essence and its existence or actual- ity, by which it is existent in the physical order. That there is no such distinction in God is conceded by all. With regard to creatures, several opinions have been advanced. Many Thomists hold that a real dis- tinction obtains here anil that the essence and exist-
