Since it is therefore by Affection merely that a Creature is esteem'd good or ill, natural or unnatural; our business will be, to examine Which are the good and natural, and which the ill and unnatural Affections.
SECT. II.
In the first place then, it may be observ'd, that if there be an Affection towards any Subject consider'd as private Good, which is[1] not really such, but imaginary; this Affection, as being superfluous, and detracting from the Force of other requisite and good Affections, is in it-self vitious and ill, even in respect of the private Interest or Happiness of the Creature.
If there can possibly be suppos'd in a Creature such an Affection towards Self-good, as is actually, in its natural degree, Conducing to his private Interest, and at the same time inconsistent with the publick Good; this may indeed be call'd still a vitious Affection: And on this Supposition a Creature[1] cannot really be good and natural in respect of his Society or Publick, without being ill and unnatural toward himself. But if the Affection be then on-
