Page:Characteristicks of men, manners, opinions, times Vol 2.djvu/39

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Concerning VIRTUE.
35

And thus we find how far Worth and Virtue depend on a knowledge of Right, and Wrong, and on a use of Reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the Affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural Affection by which the Species or Society is upheld, may, on any account, or thro' any Principle or Notion of Honour or Religion, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper object of Esteem. For such a Principle as this must be wholly vitious: and whatsoever is acted upon it, can be no other than Vice and Immorality. And thus if there be any thing which teaches Men either Treachery, Ingratitude, or Cruelty, by divine Warrant; or under colour and pretence of any present or future Good to Mankind: if there be any thing which teaches Men to[1] persecute their Friends thro' Love; or to torment Captives of War in sport; or to offer[2] human Sacrifice; or to torment, macerate, or mangle themselves, in a religious Zeal, before their God; or to commit any sort of Barbarity, or Brutality, as amiable or becoming: be it Custom which gives Applause, or Religion which gives a Sanction; this is not, nor ever can be


  1. VOL. I. p. 18, 19, 20. VOL. III. p. 115.
  2. VOL. III. p. 124.
Virtue,