gested that a ‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.” (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64, 110 S.Ct. 1717)).
Combining the “significant relationship” requirement, however, with the “dedicated to best interests” consideration, as we did in Massie (and as suggested by Whitmore), meets the concerns the Whitmore Court addressed. The existence of a significant relationship enhances the probability that a petitioner is a suitable next friend, i.e., that a petitioner knows and is dedicated to the prisoner’s individual best interests. The more attenuated the relationship between petitioner and prisoner, the less likely a petitioner can know the best interests of the prisoner. The Fourth Circuit adopted the Massie approach in tis recent decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir.2002) (“Hamdi I”), denying next-friend standing to a public defender and a private citizen who filed habeas petitions on behalf of a military detainee captured as an alleged enemy combatant in Afghanistan. Id. at 604. Construing the language in Whitmore, it noted:
[The Supreme Court in Whitmore] thought it important to begin by stating that there are “at least two firmly rooted prerequisites for ‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.” (denying minister and first cousin of prisoner next friend standing).
Hamdi I, 294 F.3d at 604 (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64, 110 S.Ct. 1717) (citations omitted and emphasis in original). Following Massie, “Whitmore is thus most faithfully understood as requiring a would-be next friend to have a significant relationship with the real party in interest.” Id.
Nevertheless, the contours of the requisite “significant relationship” do not remain static, but must necessarily adapt to the circumstances facing each individual detainee. “Significance” is a relative concept, dependent on the individual prisoner’s plight. Not all detainees may have a relative, friend, or even a diplomatic delegation able or willing to act on their behalf. In such an extreme case it is plausible that a person with “some” relationship conveying some modicum of authority or consent, “significant” in comparison to the detainee’s other relationships, could serve as the next friend. Moreover, the concept of “true dedication” is a subjective one, difficult of measurement. The existence of some relationship, whether it be from authorized representation to friendship or alliance to familial, serves as an objective basis for discerning the “intruder” or “uninvited meddler” from the true “next friend.”
In this case, however, the Coalition has not demonstrated any relationship with the detainees. The record is devoid of any effort to even communicate with the detainees. Certainly the absence of any connection or association by the Coalition with any detainee is insufficient even under an elastic construction of the significant relationship requirement to confer standing. Although there may be some extreme circumstances necessitating relaxation of the Whitmore–Massie standard, the record in this case is devoid of such circumstances. We therefore reserve consideration of these hypothetical cases for another day. See Hamdi I, 294 F.3d at 604.
- iii. The Coalition lacks next-friend standing.
We accept the Coalition’s concern for the rights and welfare of the detainees at Camp X-Ray as genuine and sincere.
