After the summarizing language quoted above, the Massie opinion never discussed the second Whitmore prong again. Instead, Massie denied next friend standing solely because the petitioners in that case failed to meet the first Whitmore prong. Id. at 1199 n. 3. Absolutely nothing in Massie turned on the resolution of the significant relationship issue pointedly left open in Whitmore.
The above-quoted language in Massie, then, was simply dicta, on any view of that concept: It was unaccompanied by any analysis whatsoever of the issue left open in Whitmore regarding the necessity of a significant relationship and was in no way relevant to any holding in Massie. As dicta, it does not bind a panel of this court. See e.g. Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir.2002) (panel not bound by dicta from prior cases); United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (defining dicta narrowly, but recognizing that “a statement [ ] made casually and without analysis” as a “prelude to another legal issue that commands the panel’s full attention” is dicta if the later panel is convinced that the earlier panel did not “make a deliberate decision to adopt the rule of law it announced.”)
I therefore do not agree that we are bound by Massie’s reading of Whitmore. Instead, I would address the role of a significant relationship in the next friend doctrine afresh.
II.
Doing so, I conclude that, like Massie, this case does not require us to decide whether the significant relationship requirement is an independent requirement or merely one way of satisfying the second Whitmore prong. Compare Sanchez-Velasco, 287 F.3d at 1026–1027 (significant relationship is probative, but may not be required) with Hamdi I, 294 F.3d at 604 (significant relationship required). Under either analysis, Coalition lacks next friend standing. Though Coalition’s concern for the detainees of Camp X-Ray is surely genuine and sincere, Coalition has not sufficiently demonstrated that it is positioned so as to provide assurance that it will best advance the detainees’ interests.
First, Coalition has failed to demonstrate any relationship with the detainees which would provide assurance that its interests were appropriately aligned with the detainees’. Such relationships might include that of blood relative, friend, present or past fiduciary agent, or any other relevant relationship.[1] See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir.2002) (“Hamdi II”) (granting next friend standing to father on behalf of son); Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 624 (11th Cir.1999) (attorney with history of representing a client has next friend standing if client is determined to be incompetent).
Not only has the Coalition failed to demonstrate any such relationship,[2] the Coalition has not otherwise demonstrated com-
- ↑ The related context of third-party standing recognizes a wide range of relationships in which the third-parties’ interests are sufficiently aligned with the interests of the rightsholder that standing is appropriate. See e.g. U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720–21, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990) (lawyer-client); Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 682, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1978) (vendor-customer); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (doctor-patient); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (school-students). In the proper context these are the sorts of relationships that could support next friend standing. I would not limit the pertinent relationships to agency or consent relationships.
- ↑ At best, Coalition could assert the relationship of a potential lawyer to a potential client. In some circumstances, such a relationship
