Page:Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush.pdf/6

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
1158
310 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

Most frequently, “next friends” appear in court on behalf of detained prisoners who are unable, usually because of mental incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves. As early as the 17th century, the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 authorized complaints to be filed by “any one on … behalf” of detained persons, and in 1704 the House of Lords resolved “[T]hat every Englishman, who is imprisoned by any authority whatsoever, has an undoubted right, by his agents, or friends, to apply for, and obtain a Writ of Habeas Corpus, in order to procure his liberty by due course of law.” Some early decisions in this country interpreted ambiguous provisions of the federal habeas corpus statute to allow “next friend” standing in connection with petitions for writs of habeas corpus, and Congress eventually codified the doctrine explicitly in 1948.

Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 162-63, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (citations and footnotes omitted).

The actual practice codified by Congress as to which persons could properly bring a petition was not without its limitations. An examination of the pre-amendment cases demonstrates consistently that each time next-friend habeas standing was granted by a federal court, there was a significant pre-existing relationship between the prisoner and the putative next friend. For example, in 1869, a wife of an enlisted soldier was granted next-friend habeas standing to bring a petition on behalf of her husband. In re Ferrens, 8 F. Cas. 1158 (S.D.N.Y.1869) (No. 4746). Similarly, in United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York considered a habeas petition signed not by the detainee, but by the detainee’s attorney. United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, 164 F. 152, 153 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1908). The court noted that the attorney was permitted to sign the habeas petition on behalf of his client, explaining the general practice and its rationale:

Notwithstanding the language of [the statute], it has been the frequent practice in this district to present habeas corpus petitions in deportation cases signed and verified by others than the person detained. In such cases, often for lack of time, as well as because of infancy or incompetency, it would be impossible to present a petition signed and verified by the person detained….

Id.

In a similar vein, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio recognized the general practice allowing next friend standing, and permitted a brother-in-law to bring a petition on behalf of a minor under 21:

This application is made on [the prisoner’s] behalf by … his brother-in-law. It is proper practice to make an application by one on behalf of another…. An application may be made by a parent or guardian having a superior right to the custody and control of the person illegally detained, when such person might not himself obtain relief.

Ex parte Dostal, 243 F. 664, 668 (N.D.Ohio 1917). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals further elaborated upon the practice and its limitations in 1921:

It has never been understood that, at common law, authority from a person unlawfully imprisoned or deprived of his liberty was necessary to warrant the issuing of a habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of his detention…. But the complaint must set forth some reason or explanation satisfactory to the court showing why the detained person does not sign and verify the complaint and who “the next friend” is. It was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course,