removed, and interest centered in the negotiations with France. Very little confidence was felt in their success, but the West was willing to wait, and Jefferson maintained his policy. Only one of his acts indicates any intention of departing from it. Some restlessness is shown in the instructions to Livingston and Monroe, written April 18, but which did not reach Paris till after the treaty had been signed. These instructions indicate an apprehension of hostility on the part of Napoleon, and direct the two ministers, in the event that such purpose should be shown by France, immediately to open secret negotiations with Great Britain with a view to alliance. They are cautioned to take no such step unless a hostile purpose of France is evident. This step plainly shows that Jefferson intended to resort to war, if it became necessary as a last resort. He would, if necessary, be come the ally of Great Britain, though preferring peace and the friendship of France.
Viewed in every aspect, whether as a patriot seeking the good of his country or as a political leader conducting his party in the paths of patriotism and victory, Jefferson undoubtedly pursued a wise and skillful course. The Federalist leaders had not only been thwarted but had been handicapped. If negotiation should succeed, their party was ruined. If war became necessary, they were committed to its support. Their course in Congress had stirred up the whole country, and the war would have the sanction of all sections. But the Federalist leaders had aided Jefferson by their agitation in a way which they had not contemplated.
Napoleon was watching American politics. The imperious will of the "proudest warrior of Europe" would have brooked no threat of war from the ruling powers of the United States. Jefferson could not approach him with any intimation of hostile purpose. But Napoleon was not only an imperious warrior. When not blinded by passion or drunk with ambition, he was also the pro-
